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NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS:
THE NEW FRONTIER IN LABOR RELATIONS -
FAIR PLAY OR FOUL? T
ANDREW M. KRAMER*
LEE E. MILLER **
LEONARD BIERMAN ***
The first amendment presumes that] information is not in itself harm-
ful, that people will perceive their own best interest if only they are well
enough informed, and that the best means to that end is to open the chan-
nels of communication rather than to close them.
Justice Harry A. Blackmun'
The success of the enterprise, like the success of a marriage, depends upon
the satisfactory adjustment of the conflicts and frictions in the day-to-day
life of [labor and management]. . . . These adjustments must be made by
the parties themselves and require daily cooperation in tolerant and
generous consideration of each other's needs and complaints. And it is only
by their honest and daily cooperation that the parties can achieve the
greater end — an efficient enterprise operating with justice for those en-
gaged in it and for the public welfare. That, indeed, is the ultimate
justification for both private enterprise and labor unions.
Dean Harry Shulman 2
One of the most significant recent developments in the field of labor rela-
tions has been the adoption of "neutrality agreements" in the automobile,
tobacco and tire industries. Neutrality agreements generally require employers
to remain "neutral" toward union organizational efforts at their facilities
where employees are not presently represented by a union. Neutrality pledges
greatly facilitate union organizing by restricting management's ability to take
actions opposing union organizing efforts. Unions are able to obtain neutrality
pledges covering nonunion facilities via their bargaining strength at an em-
ployer's unionized facilities. Such agreements constitute a form of cooperation
between labor and management. While cooperation between labor and man-
t Copyright © 1981 by Boston College Law School.
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2 OPINIONS ON THE ARBITRATOR, FORD MOTOR CO. — UAW, Section III preface
(published privately 1946) quoted in H. Wellington, LABOR AND THE LEGAL. PROCESS 91 (1968).
39
40	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:39
agement ordinarily should be encouraged, 3 neutrality agreements are at vari-
ance with the right of individual employees to receive election information, and
the employer's concomitant right of free speech, a right protected by the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act 4 and the first amendment. 5
The primary purpose of this article is to examine these conflicts and to
consider the impact of neutrality agreements upon national labor policy. To
this end, various issues arising from the advent of such agreements will be ad-
dressed. First, the recent emergence of neutrality agreements as a significant
organizing device will be examined against the backdrop of organized labor's
setbacks in other areas. A discussion of the scope of a neutrality pledge and a
tentative definition of "neutral" conduct will follow in the context of a review
of several neutrality agreements. This article will then address the proper
status of neutrality agreements as subjects of collective bargaining and review
several problems in interpreting such agreements. The various forums in
which such agreements may be enforced will also be surveyed. Finally, the arti-
cle will consider the basic issue of whether neutrality agreements are lawful.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
Labor neutrality agreements are of relatively recent origin. It was not un-
til 1976 that the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement
Workers Union (UAW) and the General Motors Corporation (GM) entered
into the first such agreement. The UAW-GM neutrality agreement was con-
tained in a letter6 between the parties which was incorporated into their collec-
3 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 6 (1937); Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975); NLRB v.
Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968).
4 29 U.S.C. 5 151 et seq. (1976).
U.S. CONST., amend. I.
6 The contents of this letter agreement are as follows:
Dear Mr. Bluestone:
During the course of the 1976 negotiations, the Union has expressed con-
cern regarding activities undertaken by local management opposing the Union's
efforts to organize production and maintenance employes at several recently
established plant locations.
Over the years General Motors has developed constructive and har-
monious relationships based upon trust, integrity, and mutual respect with the
various unions which currently represent its employes. These relationships date
back, in the case of the UAW, nearly 40 years. General Motors places high value
on the continuation and improvement of constructive relationships with these
unions as well as with all of its employes, union and nonunion alike.
In situations where the UAW seeks to organize employes not presently
represented by a union, General Motors management will neither discourage nor
encourage the Union's efforts in organizing production and maintenance
employes traditionally represented by the Union elsewhere in General Motors, but
will observe a posture of neutrality in these matters.
For its part, General Motors expects that the Union will conduct itself in
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tive bargaining agreement.' In this letter General Motors agreed that it would
remain "neutral" with respect to any UAW efforts to organize employees at
nonunionized General Motors locations.°
Since the UAW's initial success in obtaining a neutrality agreement from
General Motors, neutrality agreements have played an increasingly important
role in labor relations nationwide. The UAW, for example, has sought and ob-
tained such agreements in its negotiations with several other employers.° The
United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers Union (URW) has also
been active in this area, and has obtained neutrality pledges from most of the
major rubber tire manufacturers.'° While the UAW and URW have served as
the vanguard in promoting neutrality agreements, other unions have also suc-
cessfully pressed this issue at the bargaining table. The International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) and the Bakery, Confectionery
and Tobacco Workers, for example, have both recently obtained neutrality
agreements from major companies."
such organizing campaigns in a constructive and positive manner which does not
misrepresent to employes the facts and circumstances surrounding their employ-
ment.
Very truly yours,
GEORGE B. MORRIS, Jr.
Vice President
Dear Mr. Morris:
The Union expects to conduct itself in a manner which neither demeans the
Corporation as an organization nor its representatives as individuals. Should the
Corporation charge that representatives of the Union have engaged in such con-
duct, the National General Motors Department will investigate and, if it finds the
charge accurate, seek in good faith to remedy such conduct. Should the Union not
remedy the situation, it is expected that the Corporation will communicate with its
employes on the matter.
Sincerely,
IRVING BLUESTONE,
Vice President
Director, General Motors
Department
LEONARD WOODCOCK
President
[1976] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-13-14 (Dec. 8, 1976).
7 Id.
° Id.
9 See, e.g., Neutrality Letter of Agreement Between International Harvester Co. and
the UAW, May 2, 1980; Neutrality Letter of Agreement Between Dana Corp. and the UAW,
December 7, 1979.
'° See Craft, The Employer Neutrality Pledge: Issues, Implications, and Prospects, 31 LAS. L. J.
753, 754 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Craft].
lt
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The recent emergence of neutrality agreements as a significant organizing
tool parallels organized labor's frustration in other arenas. The trade union
movement has, for the most part, ceased to expand into new areas' 2 and has
declined sharply in numerical strength. 13 From 1970 to 1980 union member-
ship as a percentage of the total labor force fell from 24.7% to 20.8% , 14- with
the percentage decrease being even more pronounced in certain sectors of the
economy." In addition, unions are losing over half of the labor representation
elections held."' Even where unions already represent employees, there has
been a sharp upswing in employee" efforts to decertify those unions." These
trends have been exacerbated by an increasing tendency on the part of com-
panies to begin operations in states with "right-to-work" laws." In such states
even if a union wins a labor representation election, employees cannot be re-
quired, as a condition of employment, to join the union. 20
To reverse this apparent decline in union strength and to obtain what it
felt was greater "balance" between labor and management, organized labor
sought passage of the proposed Labor Law Reform Act of 1977. 21 This legisla-
tion was passed by the United States House of Representatives, but was
defeated by a filibuster in the United States Senate. 22 Because the Republican
party now controls both the Presidency and the Senate, it is unlikely that
organized labor will obtain legislative redress of this perceived imbalance be-
tween labor and management in the near future. With this avenue foreclosed,
unions will likely focus their attention instead on neutrality agreements and
" One notable exception is public sector unionism whose growth has mushroomed over
the past two decades. See generally J. GRODIN, D. WOLLETT, & R. ALLEYNE, COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 23 (1979).
1 ' See Barkin, The Decline of the Labor Movement, quoted in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTER-
LY, July 28, 1979 at 1507.
" U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, News Release, Sept, 3, 1981
quoted in [19811 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) B-1, 2 (Sept. 3, 1981).
16 Between 1978 and 1980 alone the International Association of Machinists lost
176,000 members (19.1% of its ranks). During that same period the URW lost 49,000 members
(24.5% of its membership). Id. at B-1.
16
 44 NLRB ANN. REP. 296-97 (1979).
12 It is unlawful for an employer to initiate, prepare or sponsor an employee decertifica-
tion petition. See, e.g., Nassau Glass Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. 792, 793 (1976); Lawrence
Typographical Union v. McCulloch, 349 F.2d 704, 707 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Birmingham
Publishing Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1380, 1386 (1957).
'" See Craft, supra note 10, at 755.
16 Id. See also Schwab, The Unions' Southern Discomfort, NATION'S BUSINESS 35 (June,
1981).
'Li Under the National Labor Relations Act, unions can seek an agreement with an
employer, called a "union shop" agreement, which requires all employees to join the organiza-
tion after they have been on the job at least 30 days. 29 U.S.C. Q 158(a)(3) (1973). Individual
states, however, are permitted under the NLRA to prohibit such "union shop" agreements. 29
U.S.C. 5 164(b) (1978).
21 For a listing of the proposed bills see Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of
Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 755 n.1
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Pa. Comment].
22 Id.
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other gains at the bargaining table to bolster their declining fortunes. Indeed,
the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) has already vowed to
make neutrality a key issue in its 1982 talks with the General Electric and
Westinghouse corporations." Thus, it would seem that the next chapter in the
history of neutrality agreements is just now beginning. To understand the
direction which this next generation of neutrality agreements is likely to take, it
is important to analyze the various types of agreements now extant.
II. TYPES OF NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
The specific form a neutrality agreement may take will vary from negotia-
tion to negotiation. To some extent its content will depend on the relative
bargaining strength of the parties and the relative importance each party places
on the issue. The basic element found in all such agreements, however, is a
contractual commitment by an employer to remain "neutral" with respect to
certain organizing efforts by a given union at facilities where its employees are
not presently represented by a union. For example, the 1979 neutrality agree-
ment between B.F. Goodrich Tire and Rubber Company and the URW states
that:
In situations where the URW seeks to organize production and
maintenance employees in a plant in which a major product is tires and
which is not presently represented by a union, Goodrich management or its
agents will neither discourage nor encourage the Union efforts to organize
these employees, but will observe a posture of strict neutrality in these mat-
ters. 74
23 Labor Letter, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1980, at 1, col. 5.
2+ The full text of the agreement states:
1. During the course of the 1979 negotiations, the parties discussed various
items of mutual interest regarding the relationship between the Company and the
Union.
2. Over the years B.F. Goodrich has developed and will continue to strive to
maintain and improve its constructive and harmonious relationship with the
United Rubber Workers Union in locations where the URW represents its
employees. B.F. Goodrich places high value on the continuation and improvement
of the relationship with the URW.
3. In situations where the URW seeks to organize production and
maintenance employees in a plant in which a major product is tires and which is
not presently represented by a union, B.F. Goodrich management or its agent will
neither discourage nor encourage the Union efforts to organize these employees,
but will observe a posture of strict neutrality in these matters.
4. Additionally the company and its agents will not engage in dilatory tactics
of any kind to delay its obligation to bargain with the URW once the NLRB has
certified the URW as the bargaining agent of these employees or has ordered the
company to bargain with the URW. It is understood by the parties that a resort to
the courts of the United States shall not constitute a violation of this agreement so
long as such action is undertaken in good faith and is pursued in an expeditious
manner.
5. The Union will conduct itself in such organizing campaigns in a construc-
tive manner which does not misrepresent to employees the facts and circumstances
surrounding their employment.
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In analyzing a specific neutrality agreement, several issues concerning the
proper construction of the agreement will typically arise. The first major issue
concerns the scope of the agreement. Will the agreement extend, for example,
to the organizational activities of unions that are not signatories to the agree-
ment? Will a parent corporation's neutrality pledge bind its subsidiaries? The
second major issue is what constitutes neutral conduct. Some agreements are
fairly specific in defining neutrality. As to these agreements, determining when
the neutrality pledge has been breached is a relatively straightforward task. As
to agreements in which the employer simply agrees to maintain a "neutral"
posture, the task of determining when the agreement has been breached
becomes more difficult. For example, under such agreements, does the
employer have the implied right to respond to false or provocative statements
directed against the company by the union? The following discussion will ad-
dress each of these issues in the context of representative types of neutrality
agreements.
The URW-Goodrich agreement quoted above raises several issues regard-
ing the scope of neutrality agreements. The specific terms of the agreement
cover only organizing efforts by the URW. Consequently, if another union,
say the UAW, attempted to organize a Goodrich tire plant, the company
would not be required to remain "neutral" with respect to those organizing ef-
forts. A different question, however, arises if both the URW and the UAW
seek to organize a heretofore unorganized Goodrich tire plant." A literal
reading of the URW-Goodrich agreement, on the one hand, would seem to re-
quire the company to remain "neutral" with respect to any organizational
campaign involving the URW, even if other unions are also involved. On the
other hand, such an agreement could be interpreted to apply only to the URW
and not to any rival unions simultaneously seeking to organize the same
6. Should either party charge violations of this agreement the party alleging a
violation shall notify AAA who shall immediately cause to be investigated the
allegation. AAA shall be empowered to direct the offending party to make an im-
mediate public disclaimer of the offense and state that such actions are in violation
of this agreement.
7. The parties agree that the remedy contained in paragraph (6) above is not
intended as an exclusive remedy and that the Union waives no rights it has to seek
other remedies either before the National Labor Relations Board or the Courts.
8. The charges assessed by the AAA for the enforcement of paragraph (6)
(six) shall be borne by the party filing the charge if no violation of this agreement is
found or exclusively by the charged party if a violation is found.
See 11979] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-3 (July 11, 1979).
25
 Goodrich presently has no unorganized tire plants. The URW sought a neutrality
agreement from Goodrich primarily because of the impact such an agreement would have on the
other tire manufacturers, since Goodrich set the pattern for the industry in 1979. See Washington
Post, July 8, 1979, at GI, col. 1.
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bargaining unit. This latter interpretation would obviously be endorsed by the
URW, 26
 and as a matter strictly of contract interpretation, based on the intent
of the parties, would probably be correct."
In addition to limitations as to the unions covered by the agreement, the
scope of the URW-Goodrich agreement is also restricted to the attempted
organization of "production and maintenance employees" in nonunionized
plants whose "major product" is tires. Thus, if the URW attempted to
organize clerical employees, no neutrality obligation on the part of the
employer would be triggered. Similarly, only Goodrich operations where tires
are the "major product" are covered by the neutrality pledge. The agreement,
however, nowhere describes what constitutes a "major product." Further, it is
unclear whether the URW-Goodrich agreement applies to company affiliates
that are separate legal entities or to affiliates which have traditionally con-
ducted their labor relations activities independent of the company signing the
agreement. 28
 For example, does a neutrality agreement apply to a wholly-
owned subsidiary that operates autonomously from its parent corporation?"
The second major issue concerns the limitations which the agreement
places on the employer and the union. What does an obligation on the part of a
company to remain "neutral" with respect to union organizational efforts re-
quire? The answer to this question will in turn depend largely on the specific
contractual limitations set forth, in given neutrality agreements.
Neutrality agreements may be divided into three general categories: basic
agreements, neutrality agreements coupled with transfer rights, and
agreements with specific reservations of rights. The URW-Goodrich
agreement" is an example of a basic agreement. The UAW-Dana'' and the
Tobacco Workers-Philip Morris" agreements are examples of agreements with
specific reservations of rights. 33
 The 1979 UAW-GM agreement is an example
26 Although the issue could not be raised by a rival union in a contract enforcement ac-
tion, it might be raised before the NLRB under the Midwest Piping doctrine discussed at notes
176-177 infra and accompanying text.
27 On the other hand, as discussed at notes 171-182 infra and accompanying text, in
light of the statutory requirements of 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, if a company were to agree to re-
main neutral toward a favored union it might be legally obligated to do so regarding any rival
union simultaneously seeking to organize the same facility.
28 It should be noted that similar issues arise in the UAW-GM agreement, the UAW-
Int'l Harvester agreement, the UAW-Dana agreement, the URW-Firestone agreement, the
URW-Uniroyal agreement, the Tobacco Workers-Philip Morris agreement and the IUE-GM
agreement.
28 See discussion in text and notes at notes 90-97 infra.
3° The text of this agreement is set forth in note 24 supra.
3 ' For the full agreement see text at note 43 infra.
32 For the full agreement see text at note 42 infra.
33 An even broader reservation of rights can be found in the letter agreement provided
by Goodyear to the URW. This letter, of July 10, 1979, states in pertinent part:
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of a neutrality agreement coupled with transfer rights. 34
 Although the obliga-
tions of an employer may vary significantly even within each classification,
comparing the obligations imposed by each basic type of agreement is useful in
understanding the impact such agreements may have on union organizing ef-
forts.
The URW-Goodrich agreement provides, in relevant part, that the Com-
pany will "neither discourage nor encourage" union organizational efforts
"but will observe a posture of strict neutrality in these matters." 35 At a
minimum, such agreements prevent an employer from taking a position active-
ly opposing the union. This is the basic pledge common to almost all neutrality
agreements."
The UAW-GM agreement provides an example of a neutrality agreement
which also contains transfer rights for union members. The neutrality aspect of
the UAW-GM agreement is similar in form to the basic agreement set forth in
the URW-Goodrich letter of understanding." In addition to its neutrality
A decision on the issue of union representation, in its final analysis, is sole-
ly that for the employees involved. This right of free choice is guaranteed and must
be protected at all costs. The National Labor Relations Act provides that
employees may select or reject a union without being coerced or restrained by
either the Employer or the Union. Organization campaigns should permit
employees to make a rational and accurate decision concerning the issue of
representation. To insure this, employees must have access to and be able to prop-
erly appraise all relevant information in light of their own values and desires. Any
organizational attempt should be free from restrictions that obstruct the free flow
of information and from influences that will distort the assessment of the conse-
quences. Employers and unions have an overriding obligation to see to it that
employees have such an informed choice, free from coercion or intimidation of any
sort.
In any legitimate organizing effort, the Company pledges to its employees
and to the Union that no misleading or false assertions of fact will be provided to
the employees nor will any derogatory statement about the Union or its represent-
atives be made. Further, when an organizing attempt is initiated the Company
agrees to meet with the Union for the purpose of discussing the basic ground rules
for the campaign and to communicate these rules to its employees by publication
in the plant house organ and on plant bulletin boards.
Goodyear refused to enter into the neutrality agreement negotiated by the industry. Due to the
extremely limited nature of the above letter agreement it may be inappropriate to even
characterize it as a neutrality agreement.
34
 The full text of the UAW-GM letter agreement relating to transfer rights is quoted in
[19791 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-I0 (Sept. 19, 1979).
35
 The full text of this agreement is set forth in note 24 supra.
36
 The actual language used will differ from agreement to agreement. The manner in
which the agreement is drafted will, of course, control the proper interpretation of any particular
agreement.
" Both agreements require the employer to maintain a posture of neutrality in the
event of a union organizing drive. Although the GM agreement uses the phrase "neutrality"
rather than the phrase "strict neutrality" used in the Goodrich agreement, as a practical matter
this should not make any difference since, like pregnancy, one cannot be a little bit neutral.
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pledge, however, General Motors also agreed's to give employees preferential
transfer rights which would allow union members to transfer with full seniority
to most new GM plants in the United States." Thus, employees at existing
plants were given the opportunity to transfer whenever General Motors
"transfers operations or opens new plants that make products similar to those
produced in the UAW represented plants."" Such transfer rights provide a
core of union members“ to promote UAW organizing efforts at these plants.
The potential for active union supporters and organizers to transfer freely to
unorganized plants greatly increases the impact of a neutrality pledge on those
plants.
Both the Dana and Philip Morris agreements take a more detailed ap-
proach than the Goodrich or GM agreements in setting forth their respective
definitions of neutrality. Both agreements specifically reserve to the company
the right to speak out during a union organizational campaign. The Tobacco
Workers-Philip Morris agreement incorporated in a June•6, 1979 memoran-
dum of understanding states:
Philip Morris U.S.A. agrees that in the event that the Bakery, Confec-
tionery and Tobacco Workers International Union, A.F.L.-C.I.O.,
C.L.C. attempts to organize classifications of employees whom they repre-
sent in organized facilities in any facility of the Company which is presently
unorganized, the Company will remain neutral to such organizing activity
providing the Union conducts itself in a manner which neither demeans the
Corporation as an Organization nor its representatives as individuals.
The Term "neutral" or "neutrality" shall not be construed to limit
the Company's right to discuss with its employees any benefits which the
Company provides to its employees. 42
In turn, the UAW-Dana agreement, reads as follows:
Our Corporate position regarding union representation is as follows:
We believe that our employees should exercise free choice and decide
for themselves by voting on whether or not they wish to be represented by
the UAW or any other labor organization.
We have no objection to the UAW becoming the bargaining
representative of our people as a result of such an election.
Where the UAW becomes involved in organizing our employees, we
intend to continue our commitment of maintaining a neutral position on
this matter. The Company and/or its representatives will communicate
with our employees, not in an anti-UAW manner, but in a positive pro-
Dana manner.
38 Transfer rights were added to the basic neutrality pledge during the 1979 negotia-
tions between the UAW and GM.
39 See UAW-GM letter agreement cited at note 34 supra.
48 Id.
41 See Associated Press Release, July 17, 1979. See also Washington Post, July 8, 1979,
at Gl, col. 1.
42 Neutrality Agreement of June 6, 1979 between Philip Morris, U.S.A. and Local
#16-T of the B.C.T.W.I.U.
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If a majority of our employees indicate a desire to be represented by
the UAW, we will cooperate with all parties involved to expedite an NLRB
election.
In addition, we reserve the right to speak out in any manner ap-
propriate when undue provocation is evident in an organizing campaign."
Each of these agreements specifically reserves certain areas as appropriate for
comment by the company during an organizational campaign.
Under both the Dana and Philip Morris agreements, the company cannot
attack the union directly during a campaign. The companies are free, however,
to extoll the virtues of their company and the benefits that accrue as a result of
being employed by them. The Dana agreement explicitly allows the company
to communicate with its employees in a "pro-Dana" manner. The Philip
Morris agreement simply states that "neutrality" should not be construed so
as to limit the company's right to discuss with employees "any benefits" it pro-
vides to them. 44
 The URW-Goodrich compact, by contrast, has no specific
language reserving to the company the right to speak out during a union
organizing campaign, although, as discussed below, 45 some such rights may be
implicit in any neutrality agreement.
In addition, both Dana and Philip Morris specifically retained the right to
respond to what might be described as attacks against the company by the
union. The UAW-Dana agreement explicitly reserves the right "to speak out
in any manner appropriate" where "undue provocation" becomes evident in
a campaign. 46
 The Tobacco Workers-Philip Morris agreement provides for a
similar right to respond by stating that the company's neutrality pledge is
abrogated should the union conduct itself in a manner which "demeans" the
company as an organization or its representatives as individuals. 47 By way of
contrast, the URW-Goodrich neutrality agreement is silent as to the right of
Goodrich to speak out either offensively, by making pro-company statements,
or defensively, by responding to attacks against the company- 48
The question, then, arises under a Goodrich-type agreement as to what
the effect of the company's failure to specifically reserve such rights is. Is a
43
 Neutrality agreement between UAW and Dana Corporation contained in a letter of
December 7, 1979 from Ronald Bueter, Director of Industrial Relations, Dana Corporation to
Donald E. Rand of the UAW-Dana Department.
44 See text at note 42 supra.
43
 See text and notes at notes 98-120 infra.
45 See text at note 43 supra.
" See text at note 42 supra.
48
 The URW-Goodrich agreement does provide that the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) shall be empowered to investigate violations of the agreement, which include
violations of the union's pledge to "conduct itself . . . in a constructive manner which does not
misrepresent to employees the facts and circumstances surrounding their employment." If a
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company with that type of agreement thereby prohibited from speaking out in
any fashion during an organizational campaign, or is the right to communicate
in an objective manner with employees implied from the term "neutrality" 49
or from the statutory and constitutional free speech protections employers en-
joy during organizational campaigns?" It would seem that if neutrality
agreements are legal at all, they should be interpreted in a way which protects
the right of employees to receive election information. This right is implicit in
the National Labor Relations Act. 5 ' Accordingly, it would seem that the
reciprocal right of an employer to make objective, nonderogatory statements
during an organizational campaign should be implied in any legally en-
forceable neutrality agreement.
Numerous questions concerning neutrality agreements have yet to be
resolved definitively. These questions extend far beyond the simple interpreta-
tion of such agreements, to such areas as the proper bargaining status of
neutrality agreements, the proper forums for enforcement of such agreements,
as well as the fundamental question of the legality of such agreements. It is to
an attempt to analyze these issues and to offer some preliminary conclusions
that this article now turns.
III. NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS AND THE DUTY TO BARGAIN
Bargaining topics which relate to "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment" constitute "mandatory subjects of bargaining.'' 52
Management and labor are obligated to negotiate in "good faith" with respect
to mandatory topics when such topics are raised by either party." Although
once mandatory issues are raised, the parties are required to bargain in good
faith about them, this does not compel them to agree to a proposal or require
violation is found, the AAA is empowered to require the offending party to make an immediate
public disclaimer of the offense." For the full text of this provision see note 24 supra.
" See generally text and notes at notes 98-120 infra.
" Id.
" See generally Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 388 U.S. 53, 61 (1966) (noting
that 8(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(c) (1976), was enacted to encourage "free debate" on
labor-management issues).
52 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1976). See generally First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 49 U.S.L.W.
4769, 4771-72 (June 22, 1981); R. GORMAN, LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 498-523 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Gorman]; THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW
389-423 (C. Morris ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Morris].
" 29 U.S.C. $ 158(c)(1976); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134-35
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874,
885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); Chambers Mfg. Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 721, 724
(1959), enforced 278 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1960). See generally Morris, supra note 52, at 271-347.
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them to make any concessions." Quite the contrary, either party can lawfully
insist on its position on such issues to the point of impasses' and can take
economic action in the form of strikes or lockouts to support its demands. 56
Bargaining topics which are not deemed to be "mandatory" are classified
as either "permissive" or "illegal" bargaining subjects. 57 Parties are per-
mitted, but not required, to bargain about permissive subjects." Either party is
free to refuse to discuss a permissive subject. However, if parties do negotiate
and reach an agreement with respect to a permissive bargaining subject, the
agreement can lawfully be incorporated into a binding collective bargaining
agreement." Strikes and lockouts may not be employed in support of a pro-
posal concerning a permissive subject of bargaining. 60
The final category of bargaining subjects are those which are illegal.
Generally, illegal subjects are those which if enforced would violate the
National Labor Relations Act or other laws. For example, it is illegal under
section 8(a)(3)6 t of the National Labor Relations Act to have a "closed
shop. P62 It is illegal to bargain at all about such matters and agreements
reached concerning illegal bargaining subjects are null and void."
Neither the Board nor the courts have yet had occasion to decide whether
a neutrality agreement is a mandatory, permissive, or illegal subject of
bargaining. An analysis of the relevant statutory provisions and of cases which
have construed analogous agreements, however, suggests that neutrality
agreements are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. Certainly, in a general
sense, employer neutrality could be regarded as a "term and condition of
" 29 U.S.C. $ 158(d) (1976); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 45
(1937); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953); See generally H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970); Gorman, supra note 52, at
496-98.
" See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 397 U.S. 342, 349 (1970). See also
Food Employees Local 347 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 546, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds,
NLRB v. Food Employees Local 347, 417 U.S. 1 (1974).
56
 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp., 49 U.S.L.W. at 4771 (1981); Gorman, supra note 52,
at 496-98.
" See generally Gorman, supra note 52, at 523-31.
" NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1977); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); NLRB v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 38, 575 F.2d 394, 398-99
(2d Cir. 1978) and cases cited therein. See generally Morn's, supra note 52, at 424; Gorman, supra note
52, at 497.
55
 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); NLRB v.
Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 577 F.2d 894, 897, 899 (1st Cir. 1977). See generally Gorman, supra
note 52, at 497.
6° See Gorman, supra note 52, at 497.
" 29 U.S.C. $ 158(a)(3) (1976).
62 See Penello v. United Mine Workers, 88 F. Supp. 935, 939 (D.D.C. 1950). A closed
shop is a facility where all employees hired are required to be union members when they begin
working. See Gorman, supra note 52, at 641-42.
" See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, 81 N.L.R.B. 1052,
1054-55 (1949); Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 38, 39 (1949). See generally Gorman, supra note
52, at 529-31.
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employment." However, the United States Supreme Court has suggested that
these words are to be read not as words of expansion but as "words of limita-
tion." 64 In Allied Chemical & Alkalai Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. , 65 the
Court articulated the test for determining whether an issue is a mandatory or
permissive bargaining subject when third parties not currently within the
bargaining unit covered by the contract are involved. In order for such matters
to be mandatory subjects of bargaining, they must "vitally affect" 66 the
employees within the bargaining unit. The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate
Glass held that pension benefits for retired employees did not "vitally affect"
current employees67 and were thus a permissive rather than a mandatory
bargaining subject.
Under the Pittsburgh Plate Glass "vitally affects" test, a neutrality agree-
ment would seem to be at most a permissive bargaining subject. 66 An
employer's pledge of neutrality in a collective bargaining agreement would not
seem to have any effect on the work atmosphere of employees within the
bargaining unit covered by the agreement. It would certainly not "vitally af-
fect" the "terms and conditions of their employment." The employees directly
affected by a neutrality agreement would not be current employees within the
bargaining unit. Rather, those directly affected would be employees who are
not yet bargaining unit members subject to a collective bargaining
agreement. 69
The case of NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner" is also instructive on
this issue. In Borg-Warner, the employer refused to reach a settlement with the
66 See Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 220 (1964) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
65 404 U.S. 157 (1971).
66 Id. at 179. The test to be applied where only the rights of employees within the
bargaining unit are involved is somewhat less stringent. See generally Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB,
441 U.S. 488 (1979).
67 Holding that retired employees are third parties outside the bargaining unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining, the Supreme Court stated in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.:
Together, these provisions establish the obligation of the employer to bargain
collectively with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment" with "the representatives of his employees" designated or selected
by the majority "in a unit appropriate for such purposes." This obligation extends
only to the "terms and conditions of employment" of the employer's
"employees" in the "unit appropriate for such purposes" that the union
represents.
404 U.S. at 164.
68 The URW in its 1979 negotiations with Goodyear attempted to insist on a neutrality
agreement to the point of impasse. The company filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
National Labor Relations Board. When the Board investigated the charge the union was unable
to develop a case for neutrality as a mandatory bargaining subject and subsequently dropped the
issue from negotiations. Craft, supra note 10, at 759.
69 As the Supreme Court noted in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co, , "[t]he benefits that active
workers may reap by including retired employees under the same health insurance contract are
speculative and insubstantial at best." 404 U.S. at 180.
" 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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union unless the agreement contained a "ballot" clause. 7 ' This clause would
have required the employer's last bargaining offer in all future negotiations to
be voted upon by unit employees before a strike could be called." The Court
held that the ballot clause did not concern a mandatory subject of bargaining."
The decision rested in part on the conclusion that the clause dealt only with the
relation between the employees and their union, rather than the employer-
employee relationship. 74 It also rested on the Court's judgment that the clause
undermined the independence of the union as the employee's representative by
enabling the employer to bargain directly with the employees." Thus, the
Court held that although such a clause was not illegal, it could not be the sub-
ject of mandatory bargaining."
Along the same lines, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit in Lonestar Steel Company v. NLRB" has held that "application of the
contract" clauses are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 78 An "application
of the contract" clause requires that an employer apply the terms of a collective
bargaining agreement to any new operations acquired during the life of that
agreement once the contracting union is recognized as the bargaining
representative of a majority of the employees at the new facility." In a hearing
before the National Labor Relations Board, an administrative law judge found
that an "application of the contract" clause did not relate to the terms and con-
ditions of current employees' employment and was therefore not a mandatory
subject of bargaining." Moreover, he stated "that a principal purpose for the
application of [the] contract [clause] . . . is to facilitate organizing. " 81 The ALJ
therefore concluded that "the clause did not 'vitally affect' the unit employees
and was not a mandatory subject of bargaining. "82 The Board disagreed and
held that such a clause did constitute a mandatory subject. However, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the Board, adopting the administrative law judge's
reasoning."
Neutrality agreements are analogous to both the "ballot clause" discussed
in Borg-Warner and the "application of contract" clause discussed in Lonestar
Steel. Like a "ballot clause," a neutrality agreement relates primarily to the
relationship between the union and the employees. Such agreements have vir-
tually no direct impact on the terms and conditions of employment in the
7 ' Id. at 347.
72 Id. at 345-46 n.3.
" Id. at 349-50.
" Id. at 350.
" Id.
28 Id.
" 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1349 (1981).
'a 639 F.2d at 559.
" Id. at 557.
88 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
" Id. at 559.
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bargaining unit covered by the agreement. Like an "application of the contract
clause" the principal purpose of a neutrality agreement is to promote union
organizing activity." Thus, if "application of contract" clauses and "ballot"
clauses are not mandatory bargaining subjects, neutrality agreements should
fall outside the scope of mandatory bargaining as well.
Additionally, persuasive arguments" can be made that neutrality
agreements are illegal subjects of bargaining because such agreements violate
section 8(a)(2)86 of the National Labor Relations Act and the general policies
underlying sections 7, 87 8(c), 88 8(b)(7)89 and other provisions of the Act. Conse-
quently, it would seem that neutrality agreements are, at most, permissive sub-
jects of bargaining.
IV. INTERPRETING NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
A. The "Single Employer" Issue
Neutrality agreements are generally reached as part of a master labor
agreement between a union and a corporation. 9° The question then arises, ab-
sent specific language on this point in the agreement, whether a neutrality
pledge by a corporation binds wholly-owned, but independent subsidiaries of
that corporation which are not unionized.
The Labor Board and the courts regularly treat independent divisions or
subsidiaries of corporations as "separate employers" for purposes of the
National Labor Relations Act. 9 ' In determining whether a corporate sub-
sidiary is actually "independent" from a parent corporation under the Act, the
following relationships between the parent and the subsidiary must be con-
sidered: interrelation of operations, common management, centralized control
of labor relations, and common ownership or financial control." The most im-
84 See generally text and notes at notes 12-23 supra.
85 See text and notes at notes 155-271 infra.
88 29 U.S.C. 5 158(a)(2) (1976).
87 29 U.S.C. S 157 (1976).
88 29 U.S.C. S 158(c) (1976).
88 29 U.S.C. S 158(b)(7) (1976).
g° See, e.g., Neutrality Agreement between B.F. Goodrich and the URW, [1979] DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) D-3 (July 11, 1979); Neutrality Agreement between General Motors and the
UAW, 11976] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-13 to 14 (Dec. 8, 1976).
9 ' See, e.g., Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir.
1978); cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1979); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 (Hearst Corp.),
185 N.L.R.B. 303 (1970), aff'd per curiam, Los Angeles Newspaper Guild, Local 69 v. NLRB,
443 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1018 (1972).
82 See Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local 1264 v. Broadcast Serv., 380
U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam), quoted with approval in, South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627,
IUOE, 425 U.S. 800, 802 & n.3 (1976); United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 571
F.2d 665, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1979); Marine Welding & Repair
Works, Inc. v. NLRB, 439 F.2d 395, 397 (8th Cir. 1971); Sakrete, Inc. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 902,
905 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965).
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portant of these factors is the degree of centralized control of labor relations ex-
ercised by the parent corporation." If labor relations decisions are made by the
subsidiary on an independent basis, the subsidiary will generally be viewed as
a "separate employer" for purposes of the National Labor Relations Act."
The existence of common ownership is not determinative where common con-
trol of the entities is not exercised. 95
The collective bargaining obligations of a parent corporation are ordinari-
ly not imposed on subsidiaries deemed to be "separate employers." 96 Accord-
ingly, if a nonunion subsidiary is deemed a "separate employer" for purposes
of the National Labor Relations Act, it generally should not be bound by a
neutrality agreement entered into by its parent corporation." The parties to a
neutrality agreement are free to specify that all or some subsidiary corporations
are to be bound by a parent's neutrality pledge. The absence of such a specific
provision, therefore, should be interpreted as an intent not to bind independent
subsidiaries. If the parties do specify in their agreement that certain sub-
sidiaries are to be covered by the parent's neutrality pledge, then the pledge, if
otherwise legal, should be binding on the subsidiary.
B. Obligations Under Neutrality Agreements
Generally, it would be conceded by both employers and unions that the
primary purpose of a neutrality agreement is to limit the role an employer can
play in union organizational drives and elections. Neither would deny that
neutrality agreements are generally intended to restrict the right of an
employer to express, an opinion about a particular union or about unionism in
general. Despite such unanimity on the general purpose and intent of neutrali-
ty pledges, disagreements as to the extent of the restrictions imposed by a par-
ticular agreement will inevitably arise. What must guide the proper resolution
of any such dispute, however, is first, the specific language of a neutrality
pledge, and second, the statutory and constitutional guarantees of employer
free speech.
93 See Gerace Constr. Co., Inc. and Helger Constr. Co., Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 645, 650
& n.9 (1971).
94
 See, e.g., NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 21 (9th Cir.
1971). But see Canton, Carp's, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 483 (1959).
9' See Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Local 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405, 408, 409 (D.C.
Cir. 1963). See also United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 667 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1979).
96
 In the only published arbitration, to date, which has dealt with neutrality, the parties
do not seem to have contested the applicability of their neutrality agreement to a wholly-owned
subsidiary. The arbitrator assumed, without offering any analysis, that since the subsidiary is a
Dana facility it is covered under the neutrality agreement. See Dana Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. & Disp.
Settl. 125 (1981) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
97 See United Telegraph Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 665, 667-68 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 827 (1979); Frank N. Smith Associates, Inc., 194 N.L.R.B.
212, 218 (1971).
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The language used in various neutrality agreements differs significantly.
In the basic UAW-GM neutrality agreemerit, for example, General Motors
agreed that when the UAW was engaged in organizational activities, it would
neither "encourage [n]or discourage the union's efforts," but would maintain
"a posture of neutrality."" B.F. Goodrich, in contrast, agreed to similar
language in its agreement with the URW, but with the proviso that it would
observe a posture of "strict neutrality" during union organizing efforts." The
Dana Corporation's neutrality pledge represents another approach. In its
agreement with the UAW, Dana expressly reserved the right to speak out in a
pro-company manner and to respond in any manner whatsoever to "undue"
union provocation.'°° An important question thus arises as to what, if
anything, these differences require in the context of employer and union con-
duct. This issue will be examined with reference to the statutory and constitu-
tional framework governing national labor policy as well as the contractual dif-
ferences these basic approaches represent.
An argument can be made that a pledge of "neutrality," in the absence of
a specific reservation of rights, requires an employer to refrain from making
any statements concerning a union's organizing campaign. Such an interpreta-
tion would clearly define permissible conduct. Arguably, a less restrictive
definition of "neutrality" would be impossible to enforce. This is because it
would be difficult to distinguish permitted pro-company communication from
proscribed anti-union communications. Furthermore, if a company has
pledged neither to "encourage [n]or discourage" unionization, a pro-company
communication, even if not anti-union, might still work to "discourage"
unionization and arguably violate this pledge.
These arguments favoring an absolute ban on all communications relating
to a union's organizing activities, however, are not persuasive. Judges and ar-
bitrators are called upon regularly to make distinctions similar to those which
would be called for in deciding whether a statement is a "neutral" one or one
which is intended to "discourage" union organizing efforts.'°' There is no
reason why neutrality agreements should be treated differently than other types
of agreements which require courts and arbitrators to draw fine lines between
acceptable and unacceptable conduct. Even under a restrictive interpretation
of neutrality, an arbitrator would be required to distinguish ordinary com-
munications involved in the operation of the business from those specifically
aimed at union organizing efforts. Moreover, the statutory and constitutional
implications of neutrality agreements arguably prevent such a blanket prohibi-
tion, or at least militate against interpreting the prohibitions of such
agreements so broadly. Thus, even in the absence of a specific reservation of
98 See note 6 supra.
99 See note 24 supra.
100 See text at note 43 supra.
'°' See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 296-320 (1978)
(outlining the role of arbitrators in interpreting contracts) [hereinafter cited as Elkauri].
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rights in a neutrality agreement employers should generally be permitted to
provide factual information which may be relevant to a union organizing effort
or to make statements which are "pro-company" in nature.
The concept of employer "neutrality" with respect to union organiza-
tional activities has been considered by both the Labor Board and the Supreme
Court. Between 1935 and 1941 the National Labor Relations Board adopted a
policy of requiring "neutrality" with respect to employer speech.'" Under the
Board's approach, any interference whatsoever by an employer during the
union organizational process would constitute an unfair labor practice.'"
Thus, at least where a neutrality agreement requires an employer to observe a
posture of "strict neutrality," one could argue that the Board's prior inter-
pretation of that phrase prohibits an employer from saying anything with
respect to the topic of unionization.
In light of the subsequent history of the Board's "neutrality" doctrine,
however, reliance on such early Board precedent would be inappropriate. In
NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. ,' 04
 the Supreme Court found that such
limitations on an employer's right to state his views were unconstitutional im-
pingements on an employer's first amendment rights.'" Thus, the Court held
that an employer's expression of his views on labor matters could not, in and of
itself, constitute a violation of the NLRA." 6
 This holding was later codified
and expanded upon by Congress in section 8(0" of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act which explicitly guarantees the right of employer free speech during
organizing campaigns.
Consequently, to the extent neutrality agreements legally restrict an
employer's right of free speech, such agreements must be viewed as contractual
waivers of both statutory and constitutional rights. In this context, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has made it clear that waivers of such rights will
not be readily inferred. 108
 Indeed, a union maintaining that an employer has
waived these rights has the burden of making a "clear and unmistakable show-
ing" that such a waiver has occurred. 109
 Moreover, agreements in derogation
'" Pa. Comment, supra note 21, at 756-58.
1 " See Note, Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 231,
231 (1962).
'" 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
'° 5 Id. at 477. The Supreme Court's ruling that the Board cannot mandate absolute
silence from an employer does not necessarily mean that an employer cannot voluntarily agree to
such quietude. Certainly the Board's pre- Virginia Electric holdings construing its neutrality doc-
trine to require employer silence are without any precedential value.
'°' Id.
1 " 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
100 See Gary Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 744 (1974), aff'd, Gary Hobart
Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925 (1975); Beacon Piece
Dyeing & Finishing Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 957 (1958); Tide Water Associated Oil Co., 85
N.L.R.B. 1096, 1098 (1949).
' 09 Id. at 744.
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of statutory and constitutional rights should generally be construed
narrowly."° Neutrality agreements, therefore, would seem to fall within this
general rule.
Regardless of the employer's avowed determination to remain neutral
during a campaign, at least one NLRB decision seems to require that an
employer correct union misrepresentations during a campaign or be held to
have waived any right to complain about union misconduct during the cam-
paign. In Landmark Hotel," 1 the Board refused to overturn a decertification
election, despite a material misrepresentation by the union, because the
employer had the opportunity to correct the misrepresentation and failed to do
so. " 2 The Board held that an employer was not excused from its obligation to
correct such a misstatement because it had maintained a position of neutrality
throughout the campaign."' Maintaining "neutrality" in the face of such
misstatements operated as a waiver of it rights to object to the election results.
Thus, the Board stated:
While the Employer has the right to maintain a policy of neutrality with
regard to the election issues, it may not utilize that policy as a basis for
denying to employees access to knowledge readily available to it which is
necessary to their proper evaluation of campaign propaganda. Having
denied its employees access to the truth concerning the Union's misstate-
ments, the Employer may not now be heard to object on the basis that it
had insufficient opportunity to make an effective reply. We conclude,
therefore, that, even assuming arguendo the Union's misstatements were
substantial, they do not warrant setting aside the election results. We do
not see this result as "unjustly" penalizing the Employer "for electing to
remain neutral," as does our dissenting colleague. The result does, to some
extent, penalize the Employer for closing its ears to employee questions,
which it could answer or not answer as it saw fit. 1 4
It would seem, then, that neutrality agreements would allow, and may even re-
quire, that an employer correct any misstatements or factual errors perpetrated
by a union seeking to organize its facilities pursuant to such an agreement.
Further support for the view that, even in the absence of a specific reserva-
tion of rights in a neutrality agreement, an employer should be free to make
factual statements relevant to issues raised during an organizational campaign
as well as statements which are "pro-company" in nature, can be found by
reference to judicial construction of the Railway Labor Act. 15 Unlike the
See generally In Re Gault, 387 U.S. I, 55 (1967) (holding that a juvenile's waiver of
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination will be subject to strict scrutiny); NLRB v.
Auto Crane Co., 536 F.2d 310 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that a union/company agreement in-
volving a waiver by the union of its statutory right to bargain will be construed narrowly).
11 ' 210 N.L.R.B. 822 (1974).
12 Id. at 823.
' 13
 Id.
114 Id
115 45 U.S.C. $ 151 et seq. (1976).
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National Labor Relations Act, which guarantees the employer freedom of
speech, the Railway Labor Act prohibits any "interference, influence or coer-
cion" by management in the designation of a union representative."° In inter-
preting this proscription, which is arguably more restrictive than an agreement
to remain "strictly neutral," the United States Supreme Court has stated:
The intent of Congress is clear with respect to the sort of conduct that is
prohibited. "Interference" with freedom of action and "coercion" refer to
well-understood concepts of the law. The meaning of the word
"influence"in this clause may be gathered from the context. . . . The use
of the word is not to be taken as interdicting the normal relations and inno-
cent communications which are a part of all friendly intercourse, albeit be-
tween employer and employee. "Influence" in this context plainly means
pressure, the use of the authority or power of either party to induce action
by the other in derogation of what the statute calls "self-organization."
The phrase covers the abuse of relation or opportunity so as to corrupt or
override the will, . . . 117
The Supreme Court has therefore held that, as a matter of law, ordinary
communications between an employer and its employees do not "influence"
the process of employee self-organization. Thus, the Railway Labor Act does
not prevent employers from speaking out during organizing campaigns." 8 By
analogy, there is no reason why factual communications with employees dur-
ing an organizational campaign should be viewed as breaching an employer's
neutrality pledge.
In sum, difficult issues of contractual interpretation arise as to what is the
proper scope of conduct allowed under a neutrality agreement. If specific
restrictions are set forth in the agreement, then that language should govern.
Absent such explicit restrictions, however, it seems that such agreements
should be strictly construed, in light of the important statutory and constitu-
tional principles involved. In addition, interpretation of such agreements to
permit factual communications by an employer during an organizational cam-
paign where such communications are not "anti-union" in nature would be
16 The Railway Labor Act provides, in relevant part: "Representatives ... shall be
designated by the respective parties without interference, influence, or coercion by either party
over the designation of representatives by the other; and neither party shall in any way interfere
with, influence, or coerce the other in its choice of representatives." 45 U.S.C. S 152 (1976).
" 1 Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568
(1930) (citation omitted). See also Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 543
(1937).
11' Indeed, in more recent cases the courts have interpreted the Act's prohibitions
against "influencing" elections of employee representatives even less restrictively. See, e.g.,
Adams v. Federal Express Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1356, 1369 (W.D. Tenn. 1979); Brotherhood of
Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Philadelphia, Bethlehem & New England R.R. Co., 428 F. Supp. 1308,
1314 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Teamsters v. Braniff Airways, Inc., 70 L.R.R.M. 3333. 3334 (D.D.C.
1969). Contra, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R.R.
Co., 69 L.R.R.M, 2884, 2885 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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consistent with the dictionary definition of "neutrality. " "9 Moreover, such an
interpretation would be in accord with the approach specifically adopted in a
number of neutrality agreements."°
V. ENFORCEMENT OF NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
The effectiveness of any neutrality agreement will, to a great extent, de-
pend on the ability of the parties to enforce it. Therefore, the methods by which
such agreements are enforced can be as important as the contents of neutrality
agreements. Enforcement of neutrality agreements may be sought in a variety
of forums. It is to an examination of these various forums that the discussion
now turns.
Section 301 of the NLRA provides that suits for violations of labor con-
tracts can be brought in any federal district court having jurisdiction over the
parties without regard to the amount in controversy or the parties'
citizenship."' Labor agreements may also be enforced pursuant to section 301
in state court."2 Neutrality pledges contained in labor agreements are
therefore enforceable in either state or federal court. In either court, under the
doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills,'" federal substantive law will apply.
In most cases, however, the role of the courts in enforcing neutrality
agreements will be quite limited. This is because the vast majority of private
sector labor agreements have clauses providing for dispute resolution by bind-
ing grievance arbitration. 124 If a labor agreement contains an arbitration
clause, courts are asked initially to decide only whether the dispute is ar-
bitrable. 126 If the court determines that the particular arbitration clause is
broad enough to cover the dispute at issue it will order the parties to arbitrate
the dispute. 126 In this context, the Supreme Court held that although parties
are free to draft their arbitration clause as narrowly as they wish, there will be a
general presumption in favor of arbitrability. 127 Accordingly, disputes involv-
ing a neutrality pledge will ordinarily be resolved by arbitration, unless the
19 Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary (1976), defines "neutral" as "not engaged on
either side; not siding with or assisting either of two or more contending parties."
110 See generally discussion in text and notes at notes 24.51 supra.
"' 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1978).
'" See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
In 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).
' 2' See Elkouri, supra note 101, at 7.
129 See generally United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960).
126
 Id. at 569.
' 27
 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83
(1960).
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parties to a labor agreement expressly provide otherwise. 128 Where a dispute is
governed by an applicable arbitration clause, the role of the courts will or-
dinarily be limited to compelling arbitration of the dispute, at least in the first
instance.
The recent case of Uzi W v. Dana Corp. , 129 however, demonstrates how
courts may at times overstep their proper role in the enforcement of neutrality
agreements. In Dana the UAW brought an action in federal court alleging that
the company had breached its neutrality agreement with respect to union
organizational efforts at a plant of one of the corporation's subsidiaries. 130 The
court found the dispute to be arbitrable under the parties' contractual arbitra-
tion clause and ordered that it be sent to arbitration."' The court, however,
also granted the union's request for a temporary restraining order prohibiting
the company from communicating in any way with employees at the plant
regarding the upcoming labor election.'" Dana refused to abide by this order
and was subsequently held in contempt of court.'"
The issuance of injunctive relief by the Dana court appears to be clearly at
odds with the general ban on labor injunctions as set forth in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act' 34 and as construed by the Supreme Court in Buffalo Forge Corn-
126 Parties may also set up special arbitration procedures for alleged neutrality agree-
ment violations. The URW and B.F. Goodrich, for example, have done this in their neutrality
agreement. For the text of the URW-Goodrich neutrality agreement arbitration procedure see
note 24 supra.
129
 104 L.R.R.M. 2687 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
130 Id .
'" Id. at 2688.
' 32
 Id.
'" Dana was ordered to purge itself of the contempt by:
1. ... sending a written communication, in form satisfactory to the plaintiff, to all
employees of ... [the] Corporation repudiating both the written and oral
statements of ... [the Company President], promising to abide by the contents of
its neutrality agreement, and indicating its neutrality in any forthcoming National
Labor Relations Board election;
2. ... provid[ing] access to each plant of . 	 [the] Corporation in which 	 [the
Company President] addressed assembled workers, for a representative of the
plaintiff to address each shift of workers, assembled, for the length of time that .. .
[the President] addressed such shift, and ... the President] shall be and remain
present throughout the giving of each such address;
3. ... clear[ing] all the specially colored bulletin boards throughout the . . . Cor-
poration plants of any and all anti-union materials, refrain[ing] from posting such
material on any bulletin boards in the future, reserv[ing] no less than half the
space upon said bulletin boards for the use of plaintiff to affix communications,
and giv[ing] a representative of the plaintiff daily access to each such bulletin
board for posting and for reviewing posted materials until a National Labor Rela-
tions Board election shall be held . . . .
UAW v. Dana Corp., Case No. 80-3458 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (pending before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit).
'" 29 U.S.C. $ 101 et seq. (1976).
December 1981]	 NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS 	 61
pany v. United Steelworkers of America. 135 In Buffalo Forge, the Court emphasized
that federal courts, given the proscriptions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, do
not as a rule have the power to enjoin claimed violations of labor contracts." 6
In so ruling the Court distinguished its previous decision in Boys Markets, Inc. v.
Retail Clerks Union, 137 where it had held that when a strike in violation of a no-
strike clause is precipitated by a grievance arbitrable under an applicable ar-
bitration clause, a court may enjoin the strike pending resolution of the
underlying grievance through arbitration.'" Boys Markets involved a strike in
violation of a no-strike clause resulting from a dispute over whether supervisors
could rearrange frozen food cases. The Supreme Court held that such a strike
was enjoinable. 139 In contrast, Buffalo Forge involved a sympathy strike, where
the work stoppage was not precipitated by an underlying contractual
grievance.'" The Court held that under these circumstances where the only
alleged contract violation was the strike itself, and there was no underlying
grievance to arbitrate, an injunction clearly would not lie.' 4 '
In Dana the court was not faced with a Boys Markets situation of a strike
precipitated by an alleged contractual violation. The facts of Dana presented in-
stead only an alleged violation of the neutrality agreement itself. 142 Under such
circumstances, the controlling precedent is Buffalo Forge, and the appropriate
remedy is not to enjoin the alleged breach of contract but rather simply to com-
pel the parties to arbitrate the dispute. Thus, it seems that the Dana court had
no authority to enjoin the alleged violation of the neutrality agreement. By
granting a temporary restraining order the Dana court contravened the ban on
labor injunctions set forth in the Norris-LaGuardia Act.'"
In short, disputes over the interpretation of neutrality agreements will
normally be resolved by an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. After reviewing
1 " 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
"6 Id. at 409.
"7 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
"8 Id. at 253.
"9 Id.
"° Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 428 U.S. 397, 399-400 (1976).
'*' Id. at 406-13.
142 Where a union which has agreed to a no-strike clause in return for an employer's
promise to submit all contractual disputes to arbitration goes on strike, such a strike directly
undercuts the arbitration process. Furthermore, in such cases the union has made an express
promise to maintain the status quo, i.e., not strike, pending the resolution of disputes by an ar-
bitrator. In the instant case, however, Dana made no general promise, express or implied, not to
act pending an arbitrator's ruling as to the legality of the proposed action. Consequently, an in-
junction against their action does not appear appropriate. See Amalgamated Transit Union, Div.
1384 v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 550 F.2d 1237, 1238 (9th Cir. 1977). But see Lever Bros. Co. v.
International Chem. Workers Union, 554 F.2d 115, 121-23 (4th Cir. 1976) (disagreeing with the
Greyhound standard).
!" 28 U.S.C. 101 et seq. (1976). Dana is currently appealing the lower court's action
UAW v. Dana Corp., Case No. 80-3458, pending before the United States Court of Appeals fo
the Sixth Circuit.
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the contract, the arbitrator will determine the intentions of the parties and will
decide in a given case whether an employer's communications violate the
neutrality agreement. The arbitration award will then be specifically en-
forceable in federal or state court.'"
The Court's scope of review in such cases is extremely limited. As the
Supreme Court held in United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 1 45 so
long as the arbitrator's award "draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement" and does not represent an abuse of discretion, it must be
upheld. 14" Where an arbitrator goes beyond interpreting and applying the par-
ties' collective bargaining agreement, in an effort to dispense "his own brand
of industrial justice,"" 7 his award will be overturned.'"
Arbitrators disagree on whether they are obligated to enforce contracts
which, in their opinion, violate the law, with some arbitrators taking the posi-
tion that they are empowered only to interpret the terms of the agreement.'"
Whether an arbitrator will reach the ultimate issue of the legality of a given
neutrality agreement will depend on his judicial philosophy. However, in
reviewing an arbitrator's decision on the legality issue, a court is likely to reex-
amine the issue de novo and will not be bound by the arbitrator's view of the
law. A court may examine the legality of the agreement sua sponte, even where
the arbitrator has chosen not to.' 5 °
The one published arbitration decision involving a neutrality agreement
arose from the previously discussed dispute between the UAW and Dana Cor-
poration. In this decision the basic issue of the legality of the agreement does
not appear to have been considered.' 5 ' In Dana, the arbitrator narrowly inter-
preted the provisions in the neutrality agreement which gave the company the
right, under certain circumstances, to speak out against the union.'" The ar-
bitrator held that various union misrepresentations, including false statements
about the rate of pay of other company employees, did not represent "undue
provocation" of the kind which permitted the company to avoid its pledge to
remain neutral. In an extraordinary action, the arbitrator also awarded
' 44 See general!), Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1 " 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
1" Id. at 597-99.
147
 Id. at 597.
148 See Gorman, supra note 52, at 593-94.
149 Compare Arbitrator Bernard D. Meltzer's view that where there is a clear conflict be-
tween the agreement and the law, the arbitrator should respect the agreement and ignore the law
with Arbitrator Robert G. Howlett's view that "[ail' contracts are subject to statute and common
law; and each contract includes all applicable law" quoted in Elkouri, supra note 101, at 326; see
generally id. at 321-64 (outlining the proper role of a labor arbitrator in applying external law).
"° See generally Gorman, supra note 52, at 594-98.
"' Dana Corp., 76 Lab. Arb. & Disp. Settl. 125 (1981) (Mittenthal, Arb.).
152 Id. at 129-31.
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$10,000 in damages to the union, even though the UAW did not seek such
monetary relief. 153
Although arbitration may be the forum in which the legality of neutrality
agreements will first be considered, it is the courts and the National Labor
Relations Board who will ultimately resolve this issue. Courts will likely ad-
dress this issue in section 301 actions to vacate an arbitrator's award. In such
actions, courts will be forced to look beyond the four corners of the collective
bargaining agreement and to determine whether the contract is legally en-
forceable.'" The legality issue will also arise in unfair labor practice hearings
before the National Labor Relations Board. It may arise in the context of an
employer's refusal to bargain over a particular neutrality provision, or possibly
in the context of a representational election where the employer, a rival union,
or an employee in the bargaining unit charges that a neutrality agreement
violates section 8(a)(2) or some other provision of the National Labor Relations
Act. In any event, given the importance and controversial nature of the sub-
ject, it seems likely that the question of the legality of neutrality agreements, to
which this article now turns, will ultimately be determined by the United States
Supreme Court.
VI. THE LEGALITY OF NEUTRALITY AGREEMENTS
A. Neutrality Agreements and Section 8(a)(2) —
Lawful Cooperation Versus Unlawful Support
Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act provides, in part, that
it is an unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the
formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it.'"" A major tension in our national labor policy
underlies this statutory provision. This tension arises from the interplay of two
important labor relations principles. On the one hand, fostering cooperation
between labor and management is one of the primary purposes of the National
Labor Relations Act.' 56 As the late Dean Harry Shulman remarked, labor and
management are in a sense "joint enterprisers" with the success of the enter-
prise requiring "daily cooperation" between the two parties.' 57 On the other
hand, cooperation between labor and management must not become too great
lest it become unlawful support prohibited under section 8(a)(2). 158 At the root
t" Id. at 132.
14 See Gorman, supra note 52, at 593.98.
' 66 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(2) (1976).
"6 The Act was enacted in large measure to decrease labor strife and promote peaceful
cooperative solutions to labor-management problems. See National Labor Relations Act, S 1, 49
Stat. 449 (1935). See also NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir
1968).
167 See note 2 supra.
' 5a NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d at 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968).
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of section 8(a)(2) appears to be the concern that if the relationship between
labor and management loses its adversarial nature, the rights of individual
employees' 59 inevitably will be impaired.' 6 °
The scheme envisioned by the NLRA is therefore analogous to the adver-
sarial system of American justice. Under that system, lawyers involved in
litigation are expected to cooperate with each other to facilitate the orderly ad-
ministration of justice,' 6 ' yet their basic role is that of adversaries. 162 Similarly,
although both unions and employers have an interest in cooperating so that
business will prosper, each also has conflicting interests. It is through the clash
of these interests, that a fair accommodation is reached as to the competing in-
terests of the individual employee, the corporation and the union. Just as the
courts have always struck down collusive lawsuits,' 63 the Labor Board and the
courts will strike down clearly collusive behavior between unions and
employers.'"
The critical question, of course, is where on the continuum between lawful
cooperation and unlawful support neutrality agreements fall. Neutrality
agreements clearly represent a form of management cooperation with labor.
Under such agreements, employers agree to waive their rights to speak out
against certain union organizing efforts. This waiver of rights may be relatively
broad,' 65 or may be of a more limited nature. 166 In any event, the result is that
employers yield some of their free speech rights in an effort to reach a general
accord with the union with which they have a bargaining relationship.
There is, of course, nothing wrong per se with an employer agreeing at the
request of a union to waive certain rights as part of the collective bargaining
process. Agreements with respect to "permissive" bargaining subjects' 67
 often
involve waivers by employers of traditional management rights.'" In this con-
text, waivers by an employer which are voluntarily and knowingly made
i" Hotpoint Division, General Elec. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 788, 792 (1960):
The objective of Section 8(a)(2) is to vouchsafe to the employees that in the
bargaining relationship those purporting to act for them not be rendered so subject
to employer control or dependent upon employer favor as to tend to deprive them
of the will and the capacity to give their devotion to the interest of the group they
represent.
Id.
16° This is particularly so because under the NLRA a union selected to represent the
employees becomes the "exclusive" representative of those employees, and once a representa-
tion election is held, another election in that unit is barred for at least one year. 29 U.S.C.
159(a), 159(c)(3) (1976).
161 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 7, EC 7-38 & 39.
162
 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, CANON 7, EC 7-1.
' 63 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Cleveland v. Chamberlain, 66
U.S. (1 Black) 419, 425 (1861). See also Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 1076, 1080 (1973).
164 See, e.g., NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Products, Inc., 403 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir.
1968) and cases cited therein.
162 See text and notes at notes 24, 30 supra.
166 See text and notes at notes 31.33 supra.
167 See text and notes at notes 57-60 supra.
168 See generally Morris, supra note 52, at 426-35.
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should ordinarily be upheld.' 69
 Arguably, if an employer agrees to bargain
away his right to speak out against a union in future organizing campaigns in
return for some other benefits, he should be free to do so. Indeed, if the
employer and the union were the only parties involved, one could hardly argue
against this proposition. The employer and the union, however, are not the on-
ly parties involved.'" Both employees and rival unions are greatly affected by
such agreements. It thus becomes imperative to analyze the extent to which
neutrality agreements represent assistance or support of a kind which
unlawfully interferes with the rights of individual employees and rival unions.
Case law interpreting section 8(a)(2) is instructive in this regard.
With respect to rival unions, the law is clear that an employer's noncoer-
cive declaration of a preference for one union over another does not constitute a
violation of section 8(a)(2).'" Such a declaration is protected by the employer's
right to free speech and does not reach the level of "unlawful assistance" to the
favored union. Discriminatory conduct which favors 172 one rival union over
another, however, constitutes a violation of section 8(a)(2). 173 For example,
employers clearly cannot solicit authorization cards on behalf of a favored
union, 174
 nor can they lockout or otherwise force employees to join the favored
union.'" Furthermore, under the Labor Board's Midwest Piping doctrine,'"
employers cannot recognize one union where there is a real question of
representation between two rival unions.'" Finally, employers cannot grant a
favored union advantageous access to employees.' 75
169
 Cf. D.H. Overmeyer v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (outlining the ap-
propriate standard for waiver of constitutional rights in the civil area and noting that the standard
for waiver of corporate-property rights might be less than the "knowing, intelligent, and volun-
tary" standard applied in constitutional cases).
1 " "The purpose of the Board is to protect the bargaining rights of employees, not the
bargaining rights of [a] union." NLRB v. Ben Duthler, Inc., 395 F.2d 28, 34 (6th Cir. 1968). See
also NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 564 (4th Cir. 1967).
1 " Rold Gold of Cal., Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 285, 286 (1959). See also NLRB v. Corning
Glass Works, 204 F.2d 422, 427 (1st Cir. 1953); Alley Constr. Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 999, 1004
(1974) and cases cited therein; Harry Davies Molding Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1737, 1739 (1957).
172 Conduct which does not significantly favor one of the two rival unions is ordinarily
tolerated under the Board's de minimis doctrine. See generally Shopwell, Inc., 213 N.L.R.B. 186,
188 (1974). See also Consolidated Flavor Corp., 238 N.L.R.B. 326, 329 (1978) (holding lawful an
employer's allowing an incumbent union to hold two short meetings on company premises dur-
ing non-working time even though a rival union was also seeking to organize the same unit).
1T3 See generally Gorman, supra note 52, at 205.
'" See Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 231 N.L.R.B. 264, 290 (1977),
modified on other grounds, NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fabricators, 582 F.2d 135 (2d Cir.
1978); Komatz Constr.,, Inc., 191 N.L.R.B. 846 (1971), enforced in relevant part, Komatz Constr.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1972); B.F.G. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 489,
491 (1978).
173 See Mountaineer Shaft and Tunnel Constr. Co., 234 N.L.R.B. 929, 933 (1978),
modified on other grounds, 624 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1980).
176 See Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945).
17 Id. at 1070-71.
178 See Samuel Liefer and Harry Ostreicher d/b/a River Manor Health Related Facility,
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Accordingly, if neutrality agreements are viewed as mere expressions of
preference for the contracting union, then such agreements would appear to be
lawful. Under this analysis, no violation of section 8(a)(2) would be posed by
the kind of neutrality agreement which forbids a company from saying
anything about the favored union's organizational efforts, but permits the
company to denigrate other unions. As a practical matter, however, a neutrali-
ty agreement which favors one of two rival unions goes beyond the mere ex-
pression of a preference for one union over another. By contractually binding
itself to a posture of neutrality, an employer confers a certain status on the
favored union. This status derives from the employer's actions in accepting
that union's capacity to enter into an agreement (e.g. a neutrality agreement)
applicable to a facility in which it has not won a representation election. This
status far exceeds that which is conferred by an employer's mere expression of
a preference for a given union, or by an employer's voluntary silence during a
particular organizational campaign. In this fashion an employer gives the
union signatory an unfair advantage over other unions that may wish to repre-
sent employees at an unorganized facility of the employer. 18
In reality, what is set up under a neutrality agreement is a legally en-
forceable scheme guaranteeing a continuing advantage to the favored union for
the duration of the agreement. The act of entering into such an agreement with
one of two rival unions will likely be interpreted 188 by unorganized employees
as a statement by the company that it is more willing to negotiate with one
union than another.'" Statements to that effect would clearly require that an
election be set aside.' 82 It follows, therefore, that neutrality agreements violate
section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
244 N.L.R.B. 227, 241 (1976), enf'd, 95 L.R.R.M. 3011 (2d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. O'Keefe &
Merritt Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 445, 447 (9th Cir. 1949); Interpace Corp., 189 N.L.R.B. 132, 138
(1971).
"9 Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 78 (1940) ("[even]
[s]light suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions may have a telling effect ... ").
180 The United States Supreme Court has made clear that an employer need not intend
to aid a union unlawfully for a $ 8(a)(2) violation to be found; as long as the result of the
employer's actions is unlawfully to aid the union and hamper employee free choice, a 5 8(a)(2)
unfair labor practice action will exist. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp.), 366
U.S. 731, 738-39 (1961). Further, employees' subjective reactions to employer support of a
union need not be proved for a 5 8(a)(2) action to lie. What is of primary consequence is the
tendency of the employer's assistance to coerce employees in the exercise of their rights. NLRB
v. Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1977).
R.E. WILLIAMS, P.A. JANICE, & K.C. HUHN, NLRB REGULATION OF ELECTION
CONDUCT 203 (1974),
Presumably, Section 8(c) of the Act protects the employer's right to express his ap-
proval or dislike for a particular union. However, approval or dislike, when ex-
pressed in strong terms, may be interpreted as carrying an implication that the
employer would deal differently with the preferred union if elected than with the
rival organization. This will result in election invalidation.
Id.
'" Cf. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 272, 275-76 (1954) (setting aside
election where employer stated it would be more willing to negotiate with one union than the
other).
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By focusing on the effect of neutrality agreements on rival unions, the
preceding analysis has suggested the doubtful legality of such agreements. An
analysis which focuses instead on the effect of neutrality agreements on in-
dividual employees suggests a similar conclusion. As stated by the Supreme
Court, Congress intended section 8(a)(2) to guarantee employees "complete
and unfettered freedom of choice'"" in determining who will represent them
or whether they even want union representation at all. It is therefore the right
of employees to freely choose their bargaining representative that is protected
by the NLRA generally'm and by section 8(a)(2) in particular. This right, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court, derives from "a clear legislative policy to free
the collective bargaining process from all taint of an employer's compulsion,
domination, or influence. "185 The assumption of section 8(a)(2), therefore, is
that the rights of employees to vote in free and fair elections will not be pro-
tected where a union is unduly assisted and supported in its organizing efforts
by an employer.
The NLRB has assessed the legality of employer conduct under section
8(a)(2) by looking to whether the "natural tendency" of supportive activities
by an employer is to "inhibit employees in their choice of a bargaining
representative. >,186 Applying this analysis, the Labor Board has found that
employers may freely state their opinion that employees should join a union,'"
but may not provide significant assistance to an organizing union.'" Providing
financial support to unions is a form of "significant assistance," and is express-
ly prohibited by the terms of the Act itself. 189 Similarly, helping unions by
distributing authorization cards for them,' 9° or by permitting them to use com-
pany facilities for organizational purposes has been held to violate section
8(a)(2).' 9 ' Furthermore, employers clearly cannot recognize and contract with
1A NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 588 (1941).
1 " Thus, for example, the court stated in NLRB v. Mid-States Metal Prods., Inc., 403
F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1968):
The Act was passed for the primary benefit of the employees as distinguished
from the primary benefit to labor unions, and the prohibition of unfair labor prac-
tices designed by an employer to prevent the free exercise by employees of their
wishes in reference to becoming members of a union was intended by Congress as
a grant of rights to the employees rather than as a grant of power to the union."
Id. at 704.
199 International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 80 (1940).
186 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 223 N.L.R.B. 322 (1976).
La' See, e.g., Coppus Engineering Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 570-71 (1st Cir. 1957)
(employer's statement that employees should form a company union not violative of § 8(a)(2)).
1 " Conduct which in some minor respect assists union organizing efforts is frequently
ignored under the board's de minima doctrine. See discussion at note 172 supra. See also Monon
Trailer, Inc., Div. of U.S. Railway Mfg. Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 257, 268 (1975).
189 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2) (1976). See, e.g., American Tara Corp., 242 N.L.R.B. 1230,
1245 (1979); Dennison Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012,1016.17 (1967), enf'd, NLRB v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (1st Cir. 1970).
190 See Packing Houe & Indus. Services, Inc., 590 F.2d 688, 694 (8th Cir. 1978); The
Drackett Co., 207 N.L.R.B. 447, 453 (1973), enf'd, 90 L.R.R.M. 2844 (7th Cir. 1974); B.F.G.
Gourmet Foods, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 489, 491 (1978).
191 See, e.g., Utrad Corp., 185 N.L.R.B. 434, 442 (1970). Where, however, the cir-
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a union absent a showing that the union represents an uncoerced majority of
their employees.' 92 The Board is especially wary of any employer support to a
union before the union has been selected by the employees in a free and fair
election.'" As a practical matter neutrality agreements provide greater
assistance to the favored union than other forms of support which the Board
has held to violate section 8(a)(4' 94 Such assistance is provided not only prior
to an election being held, but also with the acknowledged purpose of facilitating
union organizing effort.'"
Although an employer is free to remain silent during a union organizing
campaign or even to state his preference for a union, it is unrealistic to view
neutrality agreements as having no more force than a mere public statement by
the employer setting forth his views about unionization. Under a neutrality
agreement, an employer binds itself contractually for a specified period not to
oppose the organizational efforts of the union with which the agreement was
reached. The very fact of having reached such an agreement with the employer
thus enhances the union's stature in the eyes of the company's employees.
Such agreements may therefore be seen as binding contracts to assist, albeit
through their silence, a favored union. Viewed in this way, neutrality
agreements rise to the level of unlawful assistance to the favored union and
therefore violate section 8(a)(2).'"
Neutrality agreements also violate section 8(a)(2) because their "natural
tendency" is to "inhibit employees in their choice of a bargaining represent-
ative."'" Employee freedom of choice is inhibited by such agreements in two
ways. First, because such agreements tend to demonstrate, through an
employer's conduct, deference to a certain union, employees may be more like-
ly to view that union as more powerful and therefore a worthier representative.
Second, although neutrality agreements may seal the lips of an employer, in
the process of so doing, they say a great deal about the employer's willingness
to negotiate with rival unions. Employees unwilling to incur the wrath of their
employer may feel compelled to vote for the favored union. Viewed in either
cumstances are such that it would be otherwise impossible for a union to reach the employees,
union access to company facilities for organizational purposes will be permitted. See, e.g., S&H
Grossinger's Inc. v. NLRB, 372 F.2d 26, 29 (2d Cir. 1971).
192 See, e.g., ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altman Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731 (1961);
Komatz Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 458 F.2d 317, 332 (8th Cir. 1972); Triangle Sheet Metal Works
Div. of P&F Indus., Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. 364, 370 (1978).
'" See NLRB v. The Summers Fertilizer Co., 251 F.2d 514, 518 (1st Cir. 1958) and
cases cited therein.
194 See text and notes at notes 190-191 supra.
195
 See generally 11979] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) D-10 (Sept. 19, 1979); Cf. Craft, supra
note 10, at 754-57 (citing the need to improve union organizing as the genesis of neutrality
agreements).
' 96
 Drawing an analogy from constitutional doctrine, neutrality agreements can be seen
as a form of "speech plus." See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 598
(1978). As such, they can be subject to governmental regulation and/or proscription.
197
 Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 223 N.L.R.B. 322 (1976).
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fashion, as a promise of reward for voting for the favored union, or as a threat
against voting for rival unions, neutrality agreements tend to unlawfully in-
hibit the freedom of choice guaranteed by section 8(a)(2).
In one sense entering into such an agreement constitutes de facto recogni-
tion of a favored union, without a majority of employees in the bargaining unit
deciding to support that union. Moreover, the persons directly affected by
neutrality agreements are employees who have heretofore not chosen to be
represented by any union. Entering into a neutrality agreement with a union
would certainly affect these employees more than bargaining with the union
about the price of food in the vending machines at the plant.' 98 Yet, recogniz-
ing the union and bargaining about the latter would, in the absence of a show-
ing that the union represented an uncoerced majority of the employees in the
unit, clearly violate section 8(a)(2). Such employer assistance to unions surely
inhibits employees in their choice of a bargaining representative and should be
proscribed.
Neutrality agreements are similar to other employer conduct which has
been found to inhibit employees in their choice of bargaining representative.
For example, in NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern Inc. , 199 the Fifth Circuit upheld
a Board finding that cooperation between a company and a favored union
"went beyond legally protected cooperation over into the proscribed domain of
interference with the freedom of choice of the employees. " 200 In Keller, the
questionable conduct involved the plant manager's making employees
available to assist the union organizer in setting up an organization meeting
and allowing such a meeting to take place on company premises."' The
criticism leveled at such conduct by the Keller court applies equally well to
neutrality agreements:
We can see circumstances where management will be less resistant to a
union which already has another or other of its plants organized. This is an
example of cooperation but there is a line between cooperation and a situa-
tion where, as here, a fair inference may be and was drawn that the com-
pany and the union are working together and that the employees are not in
possession of all of the facts but were rushed, on company time and under
company auspices, into the arms of the union. This oversteps the line. 202
Thus, union-management cooperation which unduly undercuts the rights of
individual employees will be found to violate section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
Similarly, in Steak and Brew, 203 the Board held that a company violated sec-
tion 8(a)(2) by entering into a pre-election agreement which favored one of two
rival unions seeking to organize its facilities. 204 In Steak and Brew, the company
190 See generally Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 501-02 (1979).
199 405 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1968).
2°° Id. at 667.
20 ' Id. at 666.
2° 2 Id. at 667.
2" 213 N.L.R.B. 450 (1974).
204 Id. at 453.
70	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:39
agreed to have a private election conducted by an independent person
agreeable to both the company and the favored union. 205 According to the
terms of the agreement, the name of a rival union also seeking to organize the
restaurant was to appear on the ballot. The rival union, however, was not of-
fered an opportunity to participate in the agreement. 206 The costs of the elec-
tion, including payment of the person conducting the election, were divided
between the company and the favored union."' The agreement also provided
that if the favored union won the election, the company would grant it recogni-
tion, visitation rights and participation in a grievance procedure.'" No com-
parable pledge was made to the rival union if it won the private election. 209 As a
consequence, the Board held that "the Company rendered unlawful assistance
to the [favored union] and interfered with freedom of choice in the election,
thereby invalidating the results thereof. "210
Although more egregious than the neutrality agreements discussed above,
the pre-election agreement at issue in Steak and Brew offered an advantage to the
favored union similar in kind to the advantages offered to favored unions under
neutrality agreements. For example, a neutrality agreement which provides
that the company will remain neutral with respect to the organizing activities of
the union signatory"' ordinarily would not offer a reciprocal pledge as to other
unions seeking to organize that same facility. Another criticism of the arrange-
ment in Steak and Brew was that "employees were told at the polls that the elec-
tion was being conducted by an individual whose compensation came from the
favored union and the Company, [the] implication being that the rival union
did not have sufficient interest in the matter to contribute its share. " 2 " Along
these same lines, neutrality agreements tend to enhance the status of a union
which had obtained a neutrality agreement vis-à-vis other unions. As the
Supreme Court observed in International Association of Machinists v. NLRB,'"
" even slight suggestions as to the employer's choice between unions may have
a telling effect among men who know the consequences of incurring the
employer's strong displeasure. ,7214
Neutrality agreements therefore represent employer assistance or support
of favored unions which impermissibly interferes with the rights of individual
employees and rival unions. This conclusion is consistent not only with the
205 Id. at 451.
"6 Id. at 452.
" 7 Id.
208 Id,
209 Id.
"0
 Id.
211 See generally notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
212 213 N.L.R.B. at 452.
213
	
U.S. 78 (1940).
214
	 at 78. Similarly, employer concessions to an incumbent union and acceding to a
grievance of four or five laid-off employees nine days prior to an election were held to be an un-
fair interference with free choice. See Kiekhaefer Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 95, 96-97 (1958).
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standards for section 8(a)(2) violations established by case law, but also with
the purposes and legislative history of the NLRA. Section 7 of the Act sets forth
the rights of employees to organize. As originally enacted in 1935, section 7 215
guaranteed "[e]mployees ... the right to self organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of col-
lective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."'" Reading this provi-
sion in conjunction with other relevant sections of the Act,'" the National
Labor Relations Board initially viewed the encouragement of union organiza-
tion as one of its principal functions.'"
Congress, however, subsequently made clear that this was not the proper
role for the Board to play. In the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 219 Con-
gress set forth a more evenhanded approach to the regulation of labor-
management relations. One of the linchpins of this new approach was Con-
gress' amendment of section 7 of the Act. The amendment added to the
original language of section 7 the proviso that employees "shall also have the
right to refrain from any or all such activities. " 220 Congress thus made clear
that it is not unionization that is important, but rather that individual
employees have complete freedom either to join or not to join unions as they
desire. Enforcement of neutrality agreements undercuts the freedom of choice
and individual employee rights which are the cornerstones of the representa-
tional system set up by the National Labor Relations Act.
Persuasive arguments support the view that neutrality agreements violate
the spirit, if not the precise language, of section 8(a)(2). Such agreements do
not promote the "complete and unfettered freedom of choice" which Congress
sought to guarantee by enacting section 8(a)(2). On balance, neutrality
agreements appear to go beyond mere cooperation between labor and manage-
ment and can reasonably be seen as representing unlawful employer support of
union organizing efforts in violation of section 8(a)(2). In addition to these
problems posed under section 8(a)(2), neutrality agreements may also violate
other sections of the Labor Act. Such agreements adversely affect the free
speech rights accorded to employers under section 8(c), the right to vote in free
and open representation elections guaranteed to employees by section 7, and
215 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 5 7, 49 Stat. 452 (1935).
216 Id.
"7 Section 1 of the Labor Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976), for example, states that: "It is
declared to be the policy of the United States • , . [to encourage] the practice and procedure of
collective bargaining. . . ." As the Board initially viewed this policy, collective bargaining im-
plied unionization.
218 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937). See also Note,
Employee Choice and Some Problems of Race and Remedies in Representation Campaigns, 72 YALE L J .
1243, 1245 & n.17 (1963).
2 ' 9 Labor Management Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947).
2 " 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). In parallel amendments, Congress also made it an unfair
labor practice for unions to force unionization on employees. 29 U.S.C. § 1513(bX1) (1976).
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the right of employees to be free from imposed unionism. The remainder of this
article will address the impact of neutrality agreements on these statutory rights
of employers and employees.
B. Neutrality Agreements, Free Speech, and Free Elections.
Congress enacted section 8(c) in 1947, as part of the Taft-Hartley amend-
ments to the National Labor Relations Act. The section guarantees freedom of
speech to employers during union organizing campaigns by providing that:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination
thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not con-
stitute or be evidence of any unfair labor practice under any provision of
this subchapter, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or
promise of benefit."'
Congress therefore intended section 8(c) to guarantee employers complete
freedom to speak out on such matters as unionization, so long as such speech is
noncoercive in nature.
The enactment of this statutory provision represented the codification of
the Supreme Court's holding in NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co. 222
 Before
Virginia Electric, the Board had viewed its role as one of promoting the right of
employees to unionize. 223
 In pursuit of that goal, it was reluctant to permit any
"interference" with this right, 224
 even where an important competing right
such as freedom of speech 225
 was involved. The Board therefore took the posi-
tion that employers were required to remain "neutral" during a union
organizational campaign. 226
 According to the Board, maintaining a posture of
"neutrality" precluded an employer from saying anything about union
organizational activities. In Virginia Electric the Supreme Court discredited this
approach. The Court ruled that the Board's policy requiring an employer to re-
main "neutral" violated the free speech rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment. 227
 Thus, the Court held that a violation of the Labor Act could not be
found on the basis of speech alone. 228
 In enacting section 8(c), Congress ex-
plicitly incorporated this concept into the National Labor Relations Act. 229
22 ' 29 U.S.C. 5 158(c) (1976). For a discussion of the legislative history of 8(c) see
NLRB v. Golub Corp., 388 F.2d 921, 926-27 (2d Cir. 1967); Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-20 (1947).
222
 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
223 See Note, Employer Free Speech in Union Organizing Campaigns, 15 U. FLA. L. REV. 231,
231-32 (1962). See also NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
224 See text and notes at notes 102-03 supra.
225 See generally A. Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 40, 42-44 (1960).
226 See text and notes at notes 102-03 supra.
227 NLRB v. Virginia Elec. Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech. . . ." U.S. CONST., amend. I
.
228 314 U.S. at 477-79.
229 See 29 U.S.C. 5 158(c) (1976).
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Neutrality agreements appear to be inconsistent with the underlying
philosophy of section 8(c). That provision was enacted by Congress as an ex-
pression of its disapproval of legally enforced employer "neutrality" during
union organizational campaigns."° By enacting section 8(c), Congress sought
to encourage "free debate" on labor-management issues. 231 The effect of a
neutrality agreement, however, is to make this "debate" entirely one-sided.
Certainly, section 8(c) does not require employers to speak out during
union organizational campaigns. As a general rule, employers are free to speak
out or not as they see fit during such campaigns. 232 Moreover, to the extent
neutrality agreements represent the expression of an opinion by employers,
they are clearly protected by section 8(c). The problem, however, is that
neutrality agreements represent more than an employer's opinion on the
merits of unionization. Such agreements legally restrict what an employer can
say in response to union organizational efforts. The agreement is legally bind-
ing even if the employer later desires to discuss the merits of unionization with
his employees. 233 Consequently, employees are cut off from any possibility of
hearing their employer's views during an organizing campaign. The only
views employees will hear are those of the union or unions seeking to organize
the facility. Although an employer is free to refrain voluntarily from taking a
position during an organizational campaign, the imposition of legal obstacles
"° See generally Grunewald, Empiricism In NLRB Election Regulation: Shopping Kart and
General Knit In Retrospect, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 161, 166-67 (1981); Pa. Comment, supra note 20, at
761.
"L See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 388 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
282 See generally 29 U.S.C. S 158(c) (1976).
23S The fact that such agreements are legally binding regardless of how circumstances
may change over time seems to differentiate them sharply from the case where an employer has
simply decided not to speak out against the union. In the latter case, unlike the former, should
the employer at some later point want to address his employees, he is free to do so. If the courts
can be used to enforce these restrictions, it would allow organized labor to do indirectly that
which is constitutionally and statutorily impermissible. To paraphrase the United States
Supreme Court in Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948):
[I]t is ... clear that restrictions „ . of the sort sought to be created by the private
agreement in these cases could riot be ... imposed by state statute or local or-
dinance. . . So long as the purposes of those agreements are effectuated by
voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear clear that the provisions of
the Amendment have not been violated... .
But here there was more. These are cases in which the purposes of the agree-
ment were secured only by judicial enforcement. . . .
Id. at 11-13. But cf. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (state insuffi-
ciently connected with electric company's termination of plaintiff's service to constitute state ac-
tion under the fourteenth amendment). Like racially restrictive covenants, neutrality agreements
seek to utilize the courts to circumvent rights protected under federal law. It is not to protect the
property rights of those who voluntarily enter into racially restrictive covenants that the courts
will not enforce such agreements but rather it is to protect the constitutional rights of the would-
be minority purchaser. Similarly, it would seem that neutrality agreements should be held
violative of S 8(c) — not to protect the rights of the employer but rather to protect the rights of the
employees to make an informed choice.
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to the right of employees to receive information during such campaigns would
seem to be contrary to the statutory scheme envisioned by Congress in enacting
the NLRA. 234
Neutrality agreements therefore impair a right of perhaps even greater im-
portance than that of employer free speech. That right, guaranteed to
employees by section 7, is the right to vote in free and open representation elec-
tions. As the NLRB observed in its seminal General Shoe Corp."' decision, "[i]n
election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which
an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as nearly ideal as possible,
to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees." 236 Indeed, the over-
riding purpose of the NLRA is to guarantee employee "free choice" 237 — one
that is uncoerced, reasoned and thoughtful. 238
 As the Fifth Circuit noted in
Southwire Co. v. NLRB:
2" See e.g., Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 388 U.S. 53, 62 (1966), where the
Supreme Court acknowledged that 5 8(c) of the NLRA was passed to encourage "free debate"
on labor-management issues. In the first amendment context, the Supreme Court has recognized
an inherent right to receive information. As the Court stated in First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978):
„ . [T]he Court's decisions involving corporations in the business of com-
munications or entertainment are based not only on the role of the First Amend-
ment in fostering individual self-expression but also on its role in affording the
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and
ideas. . . . Even decisions seemingly based exclusively on the individual's right to
express himself acknowledge that the expression may contribute to society's
edification. ..
Nor do our recent commercial speech cases lend support to appellee's
business interest theory. They illustrate that the First Amendment goes beyond
protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit govern-
ment from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public
may draw. A commercial advertisement is constitutionally protected not so much
because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest
in the "free flow of commercial information," (citations omitted)
Id. at 783.
"' 77 N.L.R.B. 124 (1948).
"6 Id. at 127.
2" As Senator Wagner stated in the debates on the Wagner Act in 1935:
That is what I am interested in. Whatever the men want to do, if they want to
bargain individually, or through an organization within a plant, that is all right,
only if it is the free choice of the men. Of course, we are all for that. That is all I am
seeking to do, to make the worker a free man to make his choice, and I think that I
have been emphasizing that. . . The free choice of the worker is the only thing I
am interested in.
I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT of 1935, at 440 (1935).
2" General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R. B. at 126. See also Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66
(1962) where the Board stated:
Our function, as we see it, is to conduct elections in which the employees have
the opportunity to cast their ballots for or against a labor organization in an at-
mosphere conducive to the sober and informed exercise of the franchise, free not
only from interference, restraint, or coercion violative of the Act, but also from
elements which prevent or impede a reasoned choice,
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The guaranty of freedom of speech and assembly to the employer and to the
union goes to the heart of the contest over whether an employee wishes to
join a union. It is the employee who is to make the choice and a free flow of
information, the good and the bad, informs him as to the choices
available. 239
When activities, even if not constituting unfair labor practices, create an "at-
mosphere" which prevents "a free and untrammeled choice by the
employees," a representation election will be invalidated. 240
This right to free and open labor elections held under "laboratory condi-
tions," has been upheld by the courts even when challenged on constitutional
grounds. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB24' differentiated between the first amendment
standards applicable to labor elections and those applicable to general public
elections. The court stated that any impingement on first amendment rights
resulting from the Board's insistence on "laboratory conditions" in labor elec-
tions "must be weighed against the interest of employees and the public at
large in free, fair and informed representation elections. "242
In assessing whether neutrality agreements violate section 7 it is useful to
examine the legal principles governing the concept of waiver. The United
States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Magnavox Company243 held that a union could
not waive the section 7 rights of the employees it represents to distribute
organizational materials during otherwise permissible time periods. 244 The
Supreme Court noted that such a waiver should not be permitted " . where
the right of employees to exercise their choice of a bargaining representative is
involved — whether to have a bargaining representative, or to retain the pres-
ent one, or to obtain a new one. " 245 Neutrality agreements represent a situa-
tion analogous to that in Magnavox. Specifically, in negotiating a neutrality
agreement the company and the favored union are in effect agreeing to a
waiver of the right of employees to vote in free and open representation elec-
tions.
Moreover, although neutrality agreements may not be prohibited under
the first amendment, the free speech rights of both employers and employees
guaranteed under section 8(c) of the Act go beyond those constitutionally pro-
Id. at 70. Cf. NLRB v. A.J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946) (Congress has entrusted the
Labor Board with a wide degree of discretion in adopting procedures to insure that employees
have a free and fair choice in labor elections).
"9 383 F.2d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 1967).
240 General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. at 126.
241 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971).
2+2 Id. at 879.
243 415 U.S. 322 (1974).
244 Id. at 324.
245 Id. at 325. The Court was particularly concerned that in such a case the union may
be more interested in perpetuating itself and its own power than in the rights of the individual
employees. Id.
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tected. 246 Thus, for example, in Hudgins v. NLRB, 247 the Supreme Court held
that although the first amendment did not guarantee the rights of employees to
engage in economic picketing on private property, such rights might exist
under the National Labor Relations Act. 249 The NLRB subsequently con-
firmed that such rights were protected under the Act. 249 The United States
Supreme Court had previously recognized such rights during union organizing
efforts. 250 In Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB 25 ' the Court recognized that the free
exercise of organizational rights "depends in some measure on the ability of
employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from
others." 252 The Court held in both Central Hardware and NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co. , 253 that under the NLRA, where private property rights and
organizational rights conflict, the former must yield. 254 In Hudgins, the NLRB
endorsed under section 7 an employees' "right to receive information" during
an organizational campaign. 255 As discussed above, it is this right which is
severely impinged upon by neutrality agreements.
Although it can be argued that neutrality agreements contain an element
of protected expression and that such agreements reinforce the goal of reducing
labor strife through peaceful cooperation, 256 these considerations must be
weighed against the interest of employees and, indeed, the interest of the public
at large257 in "free, fair and informed representation elections. "258 When these
246 CI Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854,
860, 592 P.2d 341, 347 (1979), aff'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 4650 (June 9, 1980) (holding that the
reasonable exercise of free speech and petitioning in a privately-owned shopping center is pro-
tected under the state constitution). For an excellent discussion of protections of free speech
under state constitutions, see Note, Private Abridgement of Speech, 90 YALE L. J. 165, 165-80 (1980).
Some such protections would also seem to be guaranteed, by analogy, under §§ 7 and 8(c) of the
NLRA.
"7
 424 U.S. 507 (1975).
545
 Id. at 521.
249 Scott Hudgins, 230 N.L.R.B. 414, 418 (1977).
250 See Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 543-47 (1975); NLRB v. Bab-
cock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112-13 (1956).
251
 407 U.S. 539 (1975).
252 Id. at 543.
253
	 U.S. 105 (1956).
254 Id. at 113; 407 U.S. at 547.
2" Thus the Board stated:
It is clear that the Section 7 rights involved in Babcock & Wilcox, as in Central
Hardware, are those of the employees rather than those of the nonemployees seek-
ing to organize them. That is to say, if the employees are beyond the reach of
reasonable union efforts to communicate with them, it is the employees' right to
receive information on the right to organize that is abrogated when an employer
denies nonemployee union organizers access to the employer's property.
230 N.L.R.B. at 416.
756 See 29 U.S.C. S 151 (1976).
2" Certainly to the extent the outcome of labor elections and the decisions of individual
employees to unionize or not affects the national economy, the public at large indeed has a strong
interest.
2" Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873, 879 (2d Cir. 1971).
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competing interests are considered, it seems that the interest of the individual
employees in making an informed decision in a "free and fair election" and the
interest of the public in maintaining the integrity of the electoral process should
prevail. It follows from this that neutrality agreements violate the "laboratory
conditions" required for holding representation elections pursuant to the
National Labor Relations Act. Labor elections are not conducted under
"laboratory conditions" when employees are legally restricted from receiving
information from their employer — the only interested party who realistically
is able to provide a point of view that differs from that of the union seeking to
organize the employees. 259 Neutrality agreements therefore impermissibly im-
pair the right of employees to receive information during organizing campaigns
and should be held to violate section 7 of the NLRA.
C. Neutrality Agreements and Imposed Unionism
The safeguards which exist to insure free and fair labor elections are
meaningless if bargaining representatives are imposed on employees without
having obtained the uncoerced majority support of the employees they purport
to represent. Unfortunately, this was often the case in the early years of the ad-
ministration of the Labor Act. One method by which employees were forced to
join unions was through organizational picketing, i.e., picketing of an
employer's premises for the purpose of getting the employer to recognize the
union without an election. In such cases the employees were forced to join
unions not of their choice and regardless of their wishes. 26°
To rectify this situation, Congress in 1959 enacted section 8(b)(7) of the
National Labor Relations Act."' As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit recently noted:
[T]he ban on recognitional picketing was significantly motivated by a
desire to end the union practice of going into an employer's office without
any concern for the sentiments of the majority of the employees and
threatening to engage in picketing indefinitely unless the employer
recognized the union as the bargaining representative of the employees. 262
Section 8(b)(7) puts strict limitations on the use of organizational picketing.
Under section 8(b)(7) unions are not permitted to engage in organizational
picketing at all if another union represents the employees. Even if the
employees are unrepresented, a union can engage in such activities for no more
than thirty days before they must file a petition for a labor election. 263 Further-
2S9 Of course, the greater the extent employer free speech is allowed under a neutrality
agreement the less likely it is to violate the "laboratory conditions" test.
260 See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 1175 (1959) (statements of Senator McClellan).
261 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(7) (1976).
262 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. NLRB, 568 F.2d 12, 18 (7th Cir. 1977).
263 For a good discussion of this topic see J. FEERICK, H. BAER & J. ARFA, NLRB
REPRESENTATION ELECTIONS - LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 119-45 (1980).
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more, in the case of unrepresented employees, a representation election will be
arranged on an expedited schedule if the employer files a section 8(b)(7) unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB. 264
Congress in amending the National Labor Relations Act in 1959 generally
condemned union representation which was not freely chosen by the employees
involved. Senator McClellan, a sponsor of the amendments, stated this best
when during the congressional debates on organizational picketing he said
that:
Unionizing and collective bargaining are premised on the free choice of
individuals who work together to join a union of their choice, and to
bargain collectively; it is not based upon compulsion to join a union.
"Compulsion" is an ugly word. Decent unionism does not require it;
decent unionism does not need it. Honest unionism does not need to apply
that kind of tactics.
If unionism is good, if it is sound, if it is right, if it is just, we can trust
in the good faith and the quality and integrity of American Workers volun-
tarily to accept it, to desire it honestly, and to be enthusiastic to secure the
benefits which flow from worthy unionism. The workers will seek to
unionize. But they ought not to be compelled and hijacked to join unions
whether they want or not, when they are not given a free choice. Compul-
sion and hijacking are nothing in the world but top-down organization; and
top-down organization has no place in American law or American institu-
tions. 265
Hence, one of the primary purposes of section 8(b)(7) was to end the practice of
a union being designated as a bargaining representative without having ob-
tained the support of a majority of the employees in the unit.
This precept is inherent in the scheme of labor representation set forth in
the National Labor Relations Act. 266
 This basic policy was most recently en-
dorsed by the Supreme Court in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers Local 100. 267
In Connell, despite seemingly clear language in section 8(e) of the National
Labor Relations Act permitting such arrangements, the Supreme Court struck
down an agreement between a construction industry employer and a union
whereby the employer agreed to use only unionized subcontractors. 268
 In strik-
ing down this agreement, the Court specifically cited the enactment by Con-
gress of section 8(b)(7), and discussed how the enforcement of the agreement in
question would work to thwart the desires of individual employees and the
264
 See generally Gorman, supra note 52, at 235.
26' See note 260 supra.
266 See generally 29 U.S.C. 5 159(c) (1976) (outlining the selection of bargaining represen-
tatives by majority vote).
267
 421 U.S. 616 (1975). The Court stated: "One of the major aims of the 1959 Act was
to limit 'top-down' organizing campaigns, in which unions used economic weapons to force
recognition from an employer regardless of the wishes of the employees. Congress accomplished
this goal by enacting 8(b)(7) which restricts primary recognitional picketing. . . ." Id. at 632.
268 Id. at 624-25.
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underlying goals of that statutory provision. 269 The Supreme Court in Connell
evidenced a marked willingness to protect individual employee rights inherent
in the framework set up under the NLRA.
Although neutrality agreements do not constitute organizational picketing
violative of section 8(b)(7), nevertheless, such agreements do share many of the
basic characteristics of organizational picketing. In a very real sense, they are
an attempt by unions to use their bargaining strength at a company's union-
ized plants to "coerce" or "buy" management silence in organizing cam-
paigns at its unorganized plants. Thus, like organizational picketing, they
represent a form of "top-down" organizing.
In the final analysis, neutrality agreements will often have the practical ef-
fect of impOsing unionism on employees. This will result from the restrictions
placed on the free flow of information under neutrality agreements from
sources other than the organizing union, as well as from the very act of entering
into an agreement with a union which has not obtained an uncoerced majority
in the unit covered by that agreement. Thus, it seems that neutrality
agreements conflict with the Act's underlying policy of preventing the imposi-
tion of unionism on employees. As such, they should be struck down as
violative of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(b)( 1)2 70 even if they do not specifically violate
section 8(b)(7). 27 I
CONCLUSION
Neutrality agreements represent a new labor relations frontier. Unions,
seeing little hope over the next few years of achieving gains in the political
arena, perceive them as a way of regaining lost ground. Employers may agree
to go along with such agreements to buy labor peace, particularly if they have
only a limited number of unorganized facilities and do not foresee opening any
new ones in the immediate future. However, the group that loses the most
when neutrality agreements are entered into are the individual employees.
They are the least powerful of the relevant groups and have no say in the deci-
sion to enter into such agreements. Neutrality agreements prevent such em-
ployees from getting the full story during an election campaign. Ultimately,
under neutrality agreements, the choice to be represented by a union is not
really a free and informed one as envisioned by the drafters of the NLRA.
This is not to suggest that an employer, in every instance, has an obliga-
2 fi 9 Id. at 632 & n.11.
770 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), 158(b)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) and 8(b)(1) protect the rights
of employees from "restraint of coercion" by employers and labor organizations, respectively.
2" 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(7) (1976). In other labor contexts, the courts have refused to en-
force, as violative of 8(a)(1) or 8(b)(1), agreements which conflict with national labor policy.
Thus, for example in Scofield v. NLRB, 349 U.S. 423 (1968) the Supreme Court refused to en-
force union rules that "invade or frustrate an over-riding policy of the labor law." Id. at 429.
80	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 23:39
tion to become involved in an organizing campaign. An employer is and should
be completely free to decide to remain neutral in any given campaign. It is one
thing, however, for an employer to decide to remain neutral in a given cam-
paign, but it is an entirely different matter to agree to remain neutral in all
future campaigns involving a certain union. In light of the broader policy con-
cerns discussed herein, it would seem that neutrality agreements threaten the
very assumptions upon which the selection of a representative under NLRA
depend.
Even an employer who has a constructive working relationship with a
union could be expected to balk at entering into an agreement which will cast
doubt on the integrity of the electoral process and which will jeopardize in-
dividual employee rights. However, regardless of an individual employer's
willingness to enter into a neutrality agreement, the NLRB and the courts have
the ultimate responsibility for insuring the rights of individual employees to a
free and fair representation election under the National Labor Relations Act.
In keeping with that responsibility, the National Labor Relations Board and
the courts should hold that neutrality agreements fall outside the proper
bounds of the National Labor Relations Act.
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